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Abstract. Cheating is a key issue in multiplayer games as it causes un-
fairness which reduces legitimate users' satisfaction and is thus detrimen-
tal to game revenue. Many commercial solutions prevent cheats by react-
ing to specic implementations of cheats. As a result, they respond more
slowly to fast-changing cheat techniques. This work proposes a frame-
work using Event-B to describe and detect cheats from server-visible
game behaviours. We argue that this cheat detection is more resistant
to changing cheat techniques.
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1 Introduction
Multiplayer games give players a sense of reality and engagement more so than in
single-player games. They have gained considerable popularity in the entertain-
ment world [5, 10, 19]. Cheating is a major concern for many game developers
as it reduces the fairness of games, damages the expected game experience and
thus decreases revenue [7, 10, 17]. \Cheating" refers to any game behaviour that
players use to achieve an unfair advantage and/or a target that they are not
supposed to [15]. Cheating may exceed the possible bounds of human capabil-
ity, e.g., Aimbot, Spinbot, or provide \extra-sensory perception" such as seeing
through opaque objects (commonly called \wallhacking") as well as learning
about the hidden information (ESP) [23]. Moreover, cheating has grown to such
an extent that not only are private hackers involved but also some companies
commercially thrive by oering cheat techniques [10, 11].
Game developers face an up-hill battle with cheat developers [17]. Many
commercial solutions (e.g., DMW [13], GameGuard [14], VAC [21], etc.) act re-
actively by discovering and studying unknown cheat techniques then developing
countermeasures, as illustrated in Figure 1. However, games can remain vulnera-
ble to particular cheats in this defense process. This work is inspired by Laurens
et al. [17], a proof-of-concept solution that calculates game behaviours for in-
dications of cheating. This work attempts to formalise the description of game
behaviours using Event-B and provides a behaviour analysis method for detect-































Fig. 2. A's environment
we are not attempting to specify a complete game. As a result, matters such as
deadlock, fairness and liveness not within the scope of this work.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our ap-
proach to modelling cheating behaviour in Event-B; section 3 introduces the
actual production of cheat detectors. Section 4 validates the framework using an
example game. Section 5 discusses related work before we conclude in section 6.
2 Behaviour-based Cheat Detection with Formal
Methods
The framework presented in this paper contains both a method for modelling
game behaviour and a procedure for producing behaviour-based cheat detectors.
This framework, illustrated in Figure 2, can be divided into two sub-systems, S1
and S2:
S1 = (M;G;A;D) S2 = (game behaviour ;D; cheating results)
S1 produces cheat detectors: algorithm A uses G, a derivation of a base model M,
to produce a cheat detector D. S2 uses a detector produced by S1 to measure the
cheating behaviours of players. We next consider how we might model cheating
behaviours before introducing Event-B in section 2.2.
2.1 Cheating Behaviour Modelling
For now, we consider only games based on a client/server architecture. That
is, we have multiple players who send commands to and receive feedback and
updates from the server.
A player's behaviour is usually a thoughtful response to the current game
state. This game state is distributed by the game server to all involved players,








i.e., a game state is a collection of client states reported by all involved clients
player1::n to their game server at an instant. Thus, a particular game behaviour
can be described as
game behaviour = (game state; game state 0)
This means that a game behaviour is an ordered pair of antecedent and conse-
quent game states. A player 's behaviour is also an ordered pair
player behaviour = (game state; game state 0(player)).
player represents a player and game state 0(player) stands for the player 's re-
sponse to the antecedent game state.
We use predicates to dene these game behaviours. Let STATE be a set
containing all possible client states and PLAYER a set of all involved players.
We give a predicate, P1, for describing general player behaviour below.
P1((game state; game state 0(player))) =
game state; game state 0 2 PLAYER ! STATE ^ player 2 PLAYER
P1 is very abstract. Suppose the game involves three possible player responses,
moving, aiming and ring. We can then rene STATE to fposition; aim; reg.
At this level of abstraction, we can also specify a particular cheat, a \trigger-
bot" which automatically res whenever an opponent is located such that the
opponent is likely to be hit. This gives its users an advantage over legitimate
opponents of being the rst to re. We can describe triggerbotting behaviour in
the predicate P2 as dened below.
P2((game state; game state 0(player))) = P1 ^
(9 peer 2 PLAYER ^ peer 6= player
^ game state 0(player):aim = game state(peer):location)
) game state 0(player):re = true
The predicate P2 includes P1 in its conjunction: this means that all behaviour
described by P2 are permitted by P1. In addition, P2 describes that, whenever
an opponent is at the point of aim, the player immediately res. It is very likely
that fair (i.e., non-cheating) players can achieve immediate re responses too,
but we suggest that they do it less frequently than a cheater since a triggerbot
allows its users to exceed the typical bounds of human capability. Most wide-
spread game cheats do not employ an `alien' behaviour, a behaviour out of the
bounds of fP1g. Otherwise, cheat detection would not be dicult since the mes-
sage from the client would be obviously unacceptable. As a result, many cheats
cause more eective play than a fair player during a game period. However, a
cheat that exhibits behaviours identical (in probabilistic terms) to a fair player










Fig. 3. Derivation from base model
Using formal languages to describe a game's behaviour can ensure the con-
sistency in dierent developers' individual understanding of cheating behaviour
at dierent abstraction levels. For example, the members of a development team
(e.g., game designers, game developers, security specialists) can use a formal
description to ensure a consistent description of particular cheats, as well as the
overall design (in common with existing formal methods approaches).
2.2 Cheating Behaviour in Event-B
Event-B [3] is chosen in this particular work for two reasons. Firstly, many com-
mercial games use a vast amount of data associated with world simulation, and
thus modelling even an abstraction of these simulations would encounter compli-
cated data structures. Event-B is a state-rich formalism which suits this require-
ment. Other options included Z [22], B [1] and Circus [9]. Secondly, Event-B has
a toolkit Rodin [2, 4]. Rodin contains a model editor, an obligation generator, an
obligation viewer, an obligation automatic proof, comprehensive model analysis,
etc., together with a friendly user interface.
Event-B models can be constructed in an arbitrary way. As our contribution
involves A, a mechanical procedure for producing cheat detectors, we need to
constrain these models so that A is able to work. This work uses constraints on
both renement architecture and machine renement to ensure G's compatibility
to A via an abstraction M, the base model.
We rene the machines as shown in Figure 3. The base model M acts as the
top abstraction of client/server game systems, providing the game model with
a structure suitable for subsequent processing by A. Decomposition renement
is a technique of describing parallelism in Event-B due to Butler [8]: M uses it
to describe synchronisation between game servers and game clients. Details of
a specic game and its cheats can be added by renements from M to G via
renement. The machine G:S , the model of game servers, is rened from M:S .
The machine G:C renes M:C , modelling the game clients of a specic game.
The machines G:Cb1::bn rene G:C , modelling dierent types of cheating game
clients.
During this renement, we instantiate some variables listed in Table 1. For
conciseness, this report omits some details; they can be found in [20] (along with
full versions of the machines presented shortly). Machine G:C can be dened as
5Var Machine component description
Sf A list of machine state variables.
If (V ) A list of invariants on V , implicitly conjoined.
Ef A label for a machine event.
Xf A list of event parameters.
Pf (V ) A list of guards on V , implicitly conjoined.
Qf (V ) A list of actions on V .
Table 1. Machine component variables
Variable Machine component
Ef (event name) play
Pf (event para) pos
Pf (event guard) position(cstate) = pos





Variables buer ; clients ; game situation; local state; own ID ;Sf
Invariants : : : ; If (Sf ; buer ; clients ; game situation; local state; own ID)
Events





clientID(cstate) = own ID
cstate 2 CLIENT STATE
Pf (Sf ;Xf ; buer ; clients ; game situation; local state; own ID)
then
local state := cstate
Qf (Sf ;Xf ; buer ; clients ; game situation; own ID)
End
End
The full text of this machine (and others given in this work) has been checked
in Rodin; the version presented here is a shortened version from Rodin's LATEX
plugin.
Suppose we have a game where avatars can change their positions. Assume
the model context G:Cxt has a fresh carrier set MAP containing all possible
positions that avatars can move to in the game; a set CLIENT STATE contains
all possible client state; and one axiom position 2 CLIENT STATE !MAP .
6Variable Machine component
Ef (event name) wallhack
Pf (event guard) 9 opponent state 2 game situation
^ clientID(opponent state) 6= own ID
^ position(opponent state) 62 VISIBLE (local state)
^ (DISTANCE (pos; position(opponent state))
< DISTANCE (position(local state); position(opponent state)))
Table 3. Component variable assignments for wallhacking example
An instance of Ef can be made using Table 2 so that
play b=
rene client act
any cstate; pos where
clientID(cstate) = own ID
cstate 2 CLIENT STATE
position(cstate) = pos
then
local state := cstate
End
Now consider the cheat \wallhacking". This cheat allows players to see through
opaque objects. A behavioural characteristic of this cheat can be described that
Antecedent state: An opponent is not visible to a wallhacker.
Player's response: The wallhacker approach that opponent.
This characteristic can be described in Table 3 by adding a fresh guard to play
in a renement. This guard involves some fresh constants and variables. Briey,
game situation is dened in the base model M; it is a set containing the up-
to-date game state. These constants are dened in the Event-B context. For
example, the constant VISIBLE represents the game function that calculates
the up-to-date visible zone for a game client, and DISTANCE calculates the
distance between two map locations.
The event wallhack renes play by adding a fresh guard, which describes
that a player can approach to a legally invisible opponent. A wallhacking client




Variables : : :
Invariant : : :
Event : : :
wallhack b= : : : End
End
As more behavioural characteristics are identied, more events like wallhack can
7be added, and better cheat detection would is achieved using the algorithm A
(described in the next section).
3 Production of Cheat Detector
This work aims at mechanically producing behaviour-based cheat detectors. We
now describe our approach to detection, given the Event-B models outlined
above.
Suppose we embed a specic model of cheating behaviour into a robot player,
robot (e.g., the wallhacker behaviour or the triggerbot behaviour). Assume we
now ask the detector to examine a game player, player . The detector rst records
a sequence of player 's behaviours, which are not necessarily adjacent in time
or captured at the same interval, and then runs robot using the antecedent
game state of each behaviour and collects robot 's response to the same sequence.
Recall that a player's game behaviour is an ordered pair of the antecedent game
state and the player's response (consequent client state). It is very likely that
robot has a nondeterministic choice in its response. Thus, the detector collects
from the robot a set that contains all its possible responses in that context.
This is repeated until all collected player behaviours are used. In the end, the
detector has a sequence of responses from player and a corresponding sequence of
response sets from robot . The proportion of player 's response contained in robot 's
corresponding response set is the rate that player behaves like this cheat.
To calculate whether or not player can make the same response as robot , we
introduce the function Exam below.
Exam((game state; game state 0); player ; robot)
=
(
1 if game state 0(player) 2 robot's response set to game state
0 otherwise.
The detector D uses Exam to assess monitored game behaviour. Recall that a
game behaviour is a game state transition and described as (game state; game state 0).
Let tr be a sequence of game behaviour and k be the length of tr :
tr = h(tr1:game state; tr1:game state 0); : : : ; (trk :game state; trk :game state 0)i
That is, tr is a sequence of observations of game behaviours, or a sequence of
pairs of states. The expressions tri :game state and tri :game state
0 represent the
rst element (antecedent game state) and the second element (consequent game
state) of a particular transition tri .
Rather than calculating a single numeric matching rate between player and
robot , our detector calculates how much player acts as robot for each leading
subsequence of tr and returns a sequence of matching rates. This allows consid-
eration of trends through a particular game, as it carries more information than
a single nal rate. For example, when a player nishes at 15%, but stays above
60% more than half time of the game, this player might be suspicious.
8Let ratei be the matching rate for the subsequence htr1; : : : ; tk i. We can
calculate ratei =
Pi
m=1 Exam(trm ; player ; robot)
i
[i 2 1::k ]. This describes
that ratei is the proportion of the transitions in which player matches robot
to the total transitions that are collected until ti . We can use ratei to dene a
function rateDst to calculate a rate sequence
rateDst(htr1; : : : ; trk i; player ; robot) b= rate1; : : : ; ratek
Thus,
rateDst(htr1; : : : ; trk i; player ; robot) =
h
P1
m=1 Exam(tr1; player ; robot)
1
; : : : ;
Pk
m=1 Exam(trm ; player ; robot)
k
i
For example, a sequence of game behaviour (game state transition) is captured
as tr 0 = htr1; tr2; tr3; tr4i. Given the following
Exam(tr1; player ; robot) = 1; Exam(tr3; player ; robot) = 0;
Exam(tr2; player ; robot) = 0; Exam(tr4; player ; robot) = 1
then rateDst(htr1; tr2; tr3; tr4i; player ; robot) = h100%; 50%; 33%; 50%i.
So the function rateDst takes the input of game behaviour sequence and
produces matching rates in the same sequence. The algorithm A uses rateDst to
construct the detector D, and is dened below.
1 Algorithm: A
input : G, a game model for game.
output: D, a cheat detector for game.
2 begin
3 D b= begin
input : player , a game client.
input : tr , a sequence of server-side game state transitions.
output: ratedsrc1::cn , matching distributions for G:Cb1::G:Cbn .




6 ratedsrcn = rateDst(tr ; player ;G:Cbn)
7 end
8 end
Using the example above, A replaces robot with the machine G:Cb1::bn , which
describes the behaviours of dierent cheats. Thus, a produced detector D is able
to detect these cheats by comparing the possible behaviours specied in the
formal model. As presented in Figure 2, the algorithm A takes a behaviour
9Fig. 4. Deployment of detector (1) Fig. 5. Deployment of detector (2)
model G and returns a detector D. The resulting detector can monitor players
for the cheats that G species.
Importantly, it is necessary to discuss the criteria of judging a player using
the output of our cheat detectors. Judging a player does not rely on the player's
matching rates alone. We must consider the individual rates in the context of
all the players' rates.
For example, when most players have rates between 5% and 15%, some play-
ers may always stay at about 30%: these latter players are suspects. We must also
consider the cases that our detectors are wrongly specied, i.e., the predicates in
the Event-B model are ineective. This could result in no cheats being detected
(false negatives) or too many fair players being identied as cheats (false posi-
tives). Another interesting case concerns most players engaging in cheating: this
results in many high rates and it becomes dicult for an automated process to
suitably identify them. The detection performance is determined by the quality
of cheating behaviour knowledge that the framework users accumulate before
embedding them in the framework as predicates.
3.1 Merits of Implementation
Our cheat detection can handle increasing amounts of work in a scalable manner.
A's detectors only need the data packets that the game server distributes to game
clients for maintaining game consistency, and requests neither extra information
nor any computing service from the game server and clients. The number of
detectors working for a game simultaneously has no impact on the performance
of games, provided that the server broadcasts the relevant packets onto their
network. When dealing with a number of cheats, rather than using a single
`giant' detector for all them as Figure 4 shows, we could produce one detector
per cheat. Assume there are two cheats, wallhacking and triggerbots: a possible
deployment can be as shown in Figure 5 with, one node for one cheat. When
a new cheat detector is produced, it can be plugged into the network as a new
independent node.
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Fig. 6. Visibility zones Fig. 7. Validation design
4 Validation of the framework
This framework is validated by an experiment. An example game, TankWar
(more fully described in [20]), was used to test the resulting detector with human
volunteers. It is simple by contrast with many commercial games. But it contains
most important elements of rst-person shooter games, e.g., surviving, attacking,
limited vision, etc. More importantly, M is a generic client/server architecture
game model, and it is designed for deriving behaviour model G for the games of
this tier, even though TankWar is relatively small. Therefore, we suggest that
it is a suitable proof-of-concept test of its applicability for larger games.
TankWar , is a real-time strategy/FPS multiplayer game, and is played by
moving and shooting. Players have restricted vision as shown in Figure 6. A
player's visible zone is the area to their front and is stopped by solid objects.
Players can only see opponents who are in their visible zones.
Using our framework, we produce the model GTankWar , which describes wall-
hacking and triggerbotting behaviour. Running A, we obtain detector DTankWar ,
which is intended to detect the two cheats, as shown below.
Procedure DTankWar
1 begin
input : player , a game client.
input : tr , a sequence of server-side game state transitions.
output: ratedsrwallhack , ratedsrtriggerbot
2 ratedsrwallhack = rateDst(tr ; player ;G:Cwallhack )
3 ratedsrtriggerbot = rateDst(tr ; player ;G:Ctriggerbot )
4 end
The detector DTankWar is equipped with client machines GTankWar :Cwallhack
and GTankWar :Ctriggerbot . To examine DTankWar , a strategy is designed as shown
in Figure 7. Besides the game server and game clients, there are three more
components: a cheat detector, a client monitor and an assessment module. These
three components never return data to both server and clients and thus have no
inuence on the game experience. The client probe is a component independent
from the detector. It is made only for validating the performance of the detector
by recording each client's behaviour since we have full control of the clients for
the experiment.
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Fig. 8. Example of validation output
The top-right diagram of Figure 8 is an example of the detector's output,
presenting the matching rates in a game for a particular player. The x -axis is a
timeline and the y-axis shows matching rates. The example detector report de-
scribes that the client T02 remained at a low rate at the beginning and increased
abruptly to about 50% then gradually rose to about 90% in the end. The top-left
of Figure 8 is from the client probe, consisting of three columns: user name, time
and action. It reveals when and which clients activated a cheating play mode.
The probe report presents that player T02 joined the game at 0s and played in
a fair play mode; T02 activated cheating play mode at 45s and nished at 358s.
Assessment of the detector's performance is by comparison of the reports from
the client probes and the detector.
This validation involves a number of game trials: 32 games were monitored,
with 16 for wallhacking and 16 for triggerbotting with ve players from a pool
of seven.
In most trials, a cheat nished at a rate twice or more as high as a legitimate
player. There were only four exceptions, and three of them were accounted for
by limitation of data (the players lost the game too quickly) and only one is a
true detection failure. The success detection rate is 28 out of 32. We note that
the change in detection rate over time was sometimes interesting. For example,
some wallhacking detection reports show a rapid rate increase shortly after the
beginning. It can be envisaged that cheat detection would perform well when
game designers and developers use their knowledge about cheating to describe
problems in commercial games.
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5 Related Work
Recent research has proposed some novel techniques of cheat detection that do
not rely on knowledge about specic game vulnerabilities as many commercial
solutions do. They consider cheats by looking at particular measurements. A
work based on probability theory was proposed by Chapel et al. [10]. It proposes
two complementary frameworks based on the use of the law of large numbers
and the Bradley-Terry model [6], which calculate statistical indexes that suggest
a player is cheating. The two frameworks are both based on the assumption
that each player can be assigned a rank which determines the probability of
the outcomes of their games, and determines cheating by observing the dier-
ence from resulting ranks and expected ranks. Another novel cheat detection
design was proposed by Laurens et al. [17], which we have discussed in previous
sections. The design statistically analyses server-side observable behaviour for
indications of cheating. For example, to prevent wallhacking, the system collects
data (e.g., player view and game world geometry) and then transforms the data
to a measure of cheating based on, e.g., frequencies of behind-wall sight vector,
distance between players and walls). Subsequently, the measurements are used
by statistical algorithms to determine the probability of wallhacking.
Our work is inspired by them and has its own features. It does not rely on
any particular measurement (e.g., rank, sight vector, distance). It uses behaviour
models to investigate behavioural characteristics and uses the comparison of
possible vs. observed behaviours to detect cheats. In common with the methods
described above, its performance is resistant to fast-changing cheat implemen-
tations due to being a server-side detector.
There are other approaches. For example, it is proposed in [12] that high-level
game rules can be described in temporal logic and used to verify the properties
of game players at the run-time. The main dierence is that our cheat detec-
tion does not reply on either rule-enforcement or rule-violation. But, it is done
by simulating cheating at instant observation and matching players' behaviours
with the simulation result at each instant and calculating to which extent the
players are cheating during a reasonable period. In [18], a client patching mecha-
nism is introduced that increases the diculty of being identied and broken by
hackers. The main dierence is that our work uses formally-specied simulations
of cheaters to detect cheating and does not need patches on game clients.
Moreover, our work has some similarity to intrusion detection systems (ID-
Ses). These are primarily focused on identifying possible incidents, which are
violations or imminent threats of violation of system security policies or accept-
able use policies [16]. A typical IDS records observed events, and (1) matches
them with some event patterns (signatures) corresponding to known security
threats, (2) examines whether or not there are anomalous events using deni-
tions of normal events (proles) or (3) identies unexpected sequences of events
by comparing predetermined proles of generally accepted denitions of benign
protocol activity for each protocol state against the observed events.
The common feature of IDSes and this work is that they all use clients'
footprints (or \server-side observable behaviour") on a server or the network to
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match certain `characteristics' and calculate the indication of a threat. Typi-
cal IDSes present the characteristics (e.g., threat signature, anomalous prole,
denitions of benign protocol activity) in some form of pattern or description
language and match observed behaviours against those patterns. This framework
also uses a language |in this case, Event-B| to describe particular cheating
behaviours. Our base model M does not contain any xed cheating behaviour
patterns; it has no direct concern with cheating behaviours and acts as the top
abstraction. The validity of G and the eciency of the resulting cheat detectors
mechanically produced by A using G is determined by the quality of the cheating
descriptions that are incorporated in G. Similarly, IDSes are only as good as the
signatures, proles or denitions of benign activity.
6 Conclusions
We have demonstrated that we can use renement in Event-B to describe some
cheating behaviours in games. The resulting machines can be used to produce
cheat detectors that we argue are more resistant to changing implementations
of cheats. We have demonstrated the credibility of describing cheats via formal
specication via experiment. This experiment tests both that we can describe
the cheats in this fashion and that the resulting detector is accurate.
One might notice that this work shows a dierent concern from typical work
in formal methods. One aim is to bring the precision of formal methods to the
description of cheating behaviours. However we have not concerned ourselves
with the development of games; we are not, for example, attempting to formally
derive or prove the implementation of a game. As a result, it is out of scope for us
to address classical issues such as deadlock, fairness, liveness and inconsistency of
the games. More detailed designs may be amenable to such analysis depending on
the tool support in each instance. Moreover, we are not aware of any signicant
game designed using such formal specication or analysis.
The major advantage of this work is that it allows game developers to proac-
tively protect their games instead of defending passively against cheat tech-
niques. There is no necessity of capturing behaviour in a temporally adjacent
manner and/or at the same interval: for a long-running game, our detectors
can randomly sample behaviour several times during a period (e.g., one or two
hours), and gradually generate cheating references.
However, we must be able to describe the cheating behaviour in question in
Event-B. Essentially, we are trying to describe cheats at a very abstract level
such that the implementation of the cheat is inconsequential. Discovery of cheat-
ing behaviour is itself an interesting question which we have not attempted to
answer here. Automatic construction of these descriptions would require some
description of the rules of a game itself; thus these rules would require formal
specication.
One limitation is that this work cannot eciently detect cheats that lead
only to trivial behavioural dierence between fair players and cheaters. For ex-
ample, some games allow virtual gifts (e.g., weapons) exchanged between players.
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When people abuse this feature and illegally trade, the buyers would obtain an
unbalanced (unfair) power against the time they spent. Our detector might not
work for this cheat since there might not be a behavioural dierence between
the buyers and fair players when they exchange their avatars.
Another limitation is on game architecture. The base model M is an ab-
straction of client/server architecture games, and the behaviour model G must
be derived from it. However, this does not suit all game architectures, some of
which may have strong peer-to-peer components.
This work leaves open many possible future improvements.
{ Introduce a set of base models, M1::n to allow for a broader range of game
types.
{ Developing easier ways to produce the predicates that describe cheating be-
haviour. A further development would be to automatically identify possible
predicates describing cheating; but this itself would require some description
of the intent and rules of any particular game. We speculate that particular
patterns may arise often enough that they could be described generically.
{ Extend our framework to be able to identify game players from their be-
haviour. This would work even if they use dierent user names. This can
prevent people from cultivating avatars or farming games for buyers, or from
changing IP address to avoid countermeasures such as IP blacklisting.
Although we have used this framework only for the classication of game users
into fair-player and cheating-player groups in this paper, its application can
feasibly be extended to the classication of users in other multiuser systems,
such as a social-networking system. A could be adapted from being a creator of
cheat detectors to a creator of user classiers. A user classier could put social
network users into a variety of categories (e.g., a movie fan, a sport fan, etc.)
and even sub-categories (e.g., an action movie fan, a bicycle sport fan, etc.)
by calculating server visible behaviours. Thus, it might facilitate solutions for
delivering relevant content to the users who are most likely to be interested.
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